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Abstract 
The awakening of art to self-awareness and 
the statement of its autonomy are modern 
phenomena.  
The way we think about art in the modern age 
may be derived from the Kantian “beauty 
without concept”. Beautiful art is the work of 
the genius, who creates a work of art that is 
valuable in itself and is admired in museums 
by the public. That which I call here “the 
modern paradigm of art” is based on an 
absence: the non-conceptuality of the 
beautiful, i.e., the fact that objective qualities 
cannot define the beautiful. This absence 
establishes originality as the essential 
requirement for modern art and creates the 
possibility for artists to push the boundaries 
of the modern paradigm. Thus, the 20th-
century sees the appearance of strategies for 
overriding or substituting originality. The 
artist withdraws from behind her work, and 
the work of art is no longer an 
unapproachable object with an aura, just as 
the museum is also no longer the temple of 
the arts. But do these experiments overcome 
the frontiers of art’s modern paradigm? And, 
more generally, can this paradigm be 
overcome at all?  
Here I deduct three elements of the modern 
paradigm of art from the idea of “beauty 
without concept”: (1) the original artist, who 
is seen as a genius, (2) the work of art with an 
aura, and (3) the museum as the temple of 
art. Then I present how artists, based on the 
requirement of originality, worked on 
dismantling the frontiers of the modern 
paradigm. 
 
Keywords: modern art, autonomy of art, 
originality, beauty without concept, genius 
1. The premodern idea of art  
Artistic phenomena are as old as humankind, 
but the concept of art is a product of the 
modern age. As Kristeller proves it in an 
excellent study,  
the term ‘Art,’ with a capital A and in its 
modern sense, and the rela ed term ‘Fine Arts’ 
(Beaux Arts) originated in all probability in the 
18th-century” (Kristeller, 1951: 497).  
But if the concept of art and the system of arts 
was born in the 18th-century, then what was 
there before it? How did people think about 
art? First, art was seen as being very close to 
the crafts. Generally, it was believed that the 
artist possesses a skill that he can impart to 
his disciples and can produce a useful object 
based on this knowledge. Second, artworks 
were created and valued not only for their 
beauty, but also for the sake of their 
representative function, as manifestations of 
religious, political, and economic power, or 
sometimes for their moral message. Third, 
artworks did not have a place of their own, 
built specially for their sake. One could find 
them in churches, palaces, or cabinets of 
curiosities. Before the 18th-century, the 
artist, the work of art, and the museum did 
not exist – at least not in the sense that we 
think of today. 
As Kristeller proves it, the concept and the 
system of arts was born through sustained 
efforts. He considers Charles Batteux’s study 
as decisive in this respect. In this text, the 
18th-century French philosopher establishes 
that the arts deal with the beautiful (based on 
imitation), and constructs a system in which a 
specific place is allocated to each main branch 
of art. Kristeller concludes his essay with Kant, 
highlighting as his merit that  
he was the first major philosopher who 
included aesthetics and the philosophical 
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theory of the arts as an integral part of his 
system. (Kristeller, 1952: 42)  
Kristeller does not emphasise here the radical 
turn that took place around Kant, which 
brought us a revolutionary new concept and 
practice of art. Kant did not only endow 
aesthetics with the same dignity as that of 
epistemology and ethics but also established 
the modern paradigm of art. Before this turn, 
“most of what we think of today as art was 
not created as art” (Gaie, 2017: 48).  
2. “Beauty without concept” and 
the modern paradigm of art 
In his “Analytic of Beauty”, Kant deals with 
beauty as the object of judgements of taste, 
offering not a single, but four definitions of 
beauty, along with the four “moments” of 
aesthetic judgement. These show that beauty 
itself does not have a definition, as its 
pleasure is a matter of subjective judgement. 
That is to say, one cannot specify the 
objective characteristics of beauty, which 
could serve as its criteria. Thus, beauty is 
judged “without concept”, along with the 
joint play of understanding and imagination, 
free from any emotional or intellectual 
coercion. However, since understanding and 
imagination, which are involved in the 
judgment of beauty, function within every 
human being and are general abilities of 
humans, the judgement on beauty is not 
arbitrary after all, but has a subjective 
generality. Kant then logically derives the 
space of the fine arts from this conception of 
beauty. 
2.1. The genius 
The artist who creates the fine arts cannot 
rely on rules or any definition of beauty. 
Consequently, he has no choice than to be 
original and to create without precedents. 
Therefore, “beautiful art is art of genius” 
(Kant, 2000: 186). The craftsman, who knows 
only how to apply learned rules, is “someone 
who, because he can never do more than 
merely learn and imitate, is called a 
blockhead” (Kant, 2000: 187). He cannot 
create fine art because he works based on 
rules derived from concepts, but beauty is 
without concept.  
Nevertheless, “every art presupposes rules”, 
and art itself cannot establish these rules 
without the concept of the beautiful. 
Therefore, the genius is needed, since he has 
“the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to 
art” (Kant, 2000: 186). This is just what genius 
consists in. The artist creates without rules, 
and the rule he proposes is embodied in the 
work of art he produces. However, this is not 
a conscious and intentional rulemaking. The 
genius creates in the same way as nature: 
instinctively and without planning in advance, 
or being able to describe all the details of the 
creation process. And yet, the finished work 
gives the impression that here is nothing 
random about it, and everything is just at its 
place within it. 
This is precisely why artistic genius is an 
inborn talent and cannot be transferred or 
taught. Some professional skills can be 
transmitted, but genius itself is not teachable. 
The artist produces works that can be 
followed as models, but not copied. If the 
student does everything in the same way as 
his master, he misses exactly what is 
essential: he will not be original, while, for the 
genius, “originality must be its primary 
characteristic” (Kant, 2000: 186).  
The significance of these lines for future 
thought on art can hardly be overstated. The 
requirement of originality, so obvious for us 
that it could even be called the basic 
“aesthetic imperative” (“If you’re an artist, be 
original!”) was not a criterion before Kant. Up 
until him the novelty of an artistic approach 
was not essential. The fundamental issue was 
how well the artist managed to imitate nature 
and to represent his theme in a lifelike, or 
perhaps, passionate manner. This followed 
from the fact that art was considered 
imitation requiring technical skill. However, 
from now on, art becomes creation ‘ex nihilo’, 
requiring ingenium (‘innate talent’) – which, 
in turn, logically follows from the fact that 
beauty has no concept, and art is “beautiful” 
(or fine) art. 
The image of the artist as genius is further 
nuanced in the context of romanticism and 
the avant-garde. In Schopenhauer (2010), the 
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genius appears as a clumsy eccentric from the 
perspective of everyday life, but one whose 
sharp pure gaze sees and displays for us the 
world in a different manner. Kant and 
Schopenhauer agree that only the artist can 
be a true genius. The scientist only possesses 
the analytic knowledge, while the genius 
stands out among the “blockheads” with his 
peculiarity and originality. 
The artistic genius in condemned by his 
outstanding talent to be ignored by his 
contemporaries, the “blockheads”, who often 
stand perplexed in front of his works, and 
neither understand nor recognise him. As 
such, the genius artist creates for the future 
and expects recognition from posterity. The 
critic can no longer judge his work, but at 
most he can attempt to understand and 
mediate it for the public. 
Art lacks any functional legitimatisation: 
beauty is without interest, valuable in itself, 
and art is autonomous. The artist creates 
from an inner need, and the work of art is 
judged according to purely aesthetic criteria. 
2.2. The work of art 
The requirement of originality and the 
conception of the artistic genius pres nted 
above also entailed the revaluation of the 
work of art and the birth of a new institution, 
the museum. 
Hitherto, paintings and statues fulfilled a 
representational function. They were 
produced at request and were meant to 
demonstrate the personality, deeds, wealth, 
and taste of the patron. Furthermore, statues 
and paintings were about reality, and the 
criterion for their assessment was 
correspondence with, or similarity to, reality.  
The work of the artistic genius does not have 
any external function anymore and cannot be 
evaluated solely by external criteria. The 
painting is no longer a “window on the 
world,” as it was thought in the Renaissance. 
The artist’s job is no longer to represent the 
visible. The genius artist is driven exclusively 
by an internal need for creation, and his 
creation expresses his internal world solely, 
or in other words, to return to Kant’s 
formulations, its function is “the presentation 
of aesthetic ideas” (Kant, 2000: 192). 
The work of art is not an object that can be 
created at any time and in any number of 
copies. A specific artist can only create a 
particular work of art, and only once. The 
artwork’s originality and uniqueness is a 
consequence of its author’s originality. 
Hence, works of art are increasingly 
separated from everyday objects, and 
similarly to religious objects, their aura 
becomes more and more visible, as a “strange 
tissue of space and time: the unique 
apparition of a distance, however near it may 
be” (Benjamin 2008: 23). The transfiguration 
of artworks (Danto 1974) manifests itself 
primarily in the fact that we do not treat them 
as mere objects anymore, but almost as life 
forms, attributing to them bodily integrity 
otherwise characteristic only of living beings. 
For instance, we consider paintings to be 
organic wholes to which one cannot add and 
from which one cannot subtract anything – 
even if we are speaking of a completely 
homogenous, monochrome painting. This 
was not at all the case even at the beginning 
of the 18th-century. In 1715, Rembrandt’s 
famous Night Watch was cut on all sides 
to fit into the town hall in Amsterdam (thus 
even removing two characters from the 
painting). Nowadays, this would be 
considered an unimaginable act of vandalism. 
The aura of the artwork demands our 
unconditioned respect and reverence.  
2.3. The museum 
The newly born art object also needed a new 
home, where the public could approach it 
with admiration and respect. This temple of 
the arts is the museum, which has spread all 
across Europe also in the second half of the 
18th-century. The expression “temple of the 
arts” is not coincidental: the museum collects, 
researches, and preserves for posterity highly 
valued artworks, protecting them from the 
damaging effects of time and exhibiting them 
in a separate space, illuminated and equipped 
with frames and labels for the visitors. Most 
classic museums resemble ancient Greek 
temples even visually. They are imposing 
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buildings in which the stairs lead to an 
entrance framed by pillars and crowned with 
the tympanum. Exhibited artworks are 
usually protected by a security line from the 
visitors, who are prohibited from getting too 
close to them. Similarly to the temple, the 
museum is also a location for quiet 
meditation and finding ourselves, where one 
should not make any noise, run around, or 
laugh, but contemplate the artworks in 
respectful silence. 
The museum further strengthens the 
autonomous conception of art, i.e., the 
impression that artists and artworks belong to 
a separate world, removed from our everyday 
life, which has its own rules and is not 
confined by the profane expectations of 
ordinary people.   
So this is how the modern paradigm of the 
fine arts now stands before us in a tight 
formation, being composed of the artistic 
genius, the artwork with its aura, and the 
museum. The artist is not a craftsman 
anymore, but an inspired and original creator, 
just as the work of art is no longer an everyday 
object, but a complete, inviolable, and unique 
entity, and as the museum is also no more a 
privately owned and crowded cabinet of 
curiosities, but a building that is open to the 
public and an essentially public space for 
admiring art. This entire coherent conceptual 
apparatus can be derived from Kant’s “beauty 
without concept”. 
The lack that is at the heart of beauty, which 
demands originality from the artist and 
commands him to impose his own rules on 
art, simultaneously also enables him to attack 
the frontiers of the modern art paradigm 
itself. 
3. The vertigo of originality 
The requirement of originality forces artists to 
become experimental. Thus, the art of the 
20th-century mainly consists of artistic 
projects which call into question the 
paradigm sketched out above. The artist 
leaves the museum behind, the artwork’s 
aura is battered, and the artist steps out from 
behind her work. 
3.1. Out of the museum  
The non-conceptuality of the beautiful 
introduces a conception of art according to 
which the artistic genius is always ahead of his 
time precisely due to his genius, creating 
artworks which are incomprehensible to his 
contemporaries and will only be valued by 
posterity. The autonomous art emphasised by 
modernism, or the conception of l’art pour 
l’art, will soon end in the elitist l’art pour 
l’artiste motto, as art loses its connection to 
the public, and the public is no longer really 
interested in art. 
Some artists begin to work on closing this gap 
between artists and ordinary people, or 
between art and life. In their view, the 
museum is the antechamber to the death of 
art, where art objects become relics instead 
of our everyday nourishment. Therefore, they 
invent art forms, which relate critically and 
ironically to the museum or even exist outside 
it. 
In the first category, we have artworks, which 
introduce everyday objects and common 
materials into the museum. One such 
example is Duchamp’s Fountain, which, if 
introduced into the museum, threatens the 
seriousness of all other exhibited objects. This 
gesture is further intensified by Maurizio 
Cattelan’s America (2016), a fully functional, 
solid 18-karat-gold toilet exhibited in New 
York’s Guggenheim Museum – not on a 
pedestal, but in one of the smaller rooms, so 
it can be handy when needed. The second 
category contains, among others, 
performances and works of land art. 
Performances cannot be conserved in the first 
place. At most, one can exhibit their 
documentation in the museum. The 
performance has to be experienced in person. 
If we only encounter its documentation, it is 
as if one would hang a description of The 
Night Watch on the wall instead of the 
painting. Similarly, land art also cannot be 
brought into the museum. It is created in a 
place where theoretically everyone can see in 
without buying an entrance ticket, and only 
its documentation, such as photographs, 
videos, plans, and videos of land art can enter 
into the museum. Land art is dedicated not to 
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the connoisseurs, but to everyone who passes 
by it. 
Incidentally, these examples also show that 
the modern paradigm of art does not go down 
in gentle surrender. The museum and the art 
gallery did not crumble to dust under the 
impact of the Fountain but instead annexed 
it. Museums continue to collect 
documentation of performances, plans, and 
photographs of land art, and the public also 
continues to gaze at them behind the glass 
windows respectfully. 
At the same time, the contemporary museum 
is evidently attempting to break out of its 
isolation, and functions as a kind of 
professional, cultural centre instead of a 
“temple of the arts”, with museum-
pedagogical programs and community 
projects. 
3.2. Against the artwork  
The 19th-century artwork was a specific object 
(e.g. a painting, a statue, a drawing, or a relief, 
etc.). Later, the originality of the artist will 
also manifest itself in the fact that artworks, 
which are difficult to identify are becoming 
increasingly prevalent since the second part 
of the 20th-century. 
On the one hand, we have art forms not 
embodied in objects, but nevertheless 
belonging to the field of the visual arts, e.g. 
performances, happenings, the “social 
sculptures” of Beuys, and Fluxus events. The 
situation becomes even more complicated 
towards the end of the 20th-century and 
during the first years of our century with the 
phenomena of relational art. Tobias 
Rehberger’s cafeteria at the Venice Biennale, 
with its delicious espressos and croissants, is 
not also an artwork at first sight. In Rirkrit 
Tiravanijat’s hidden rooftop teahouse, at 
Singapore’s National Gallery, one can have 
real tea and even participate in a tea 
ceremony, though it is uncertain whether this 
is art at all.  
On the other hand, within the world of 
objects, our ideas about paintings and 
sculptures are also changing, as the 
boundaries of art are continuously expanded. 
At the middle of the 19th-century, it was 
scandalous for Courbet to depict 
stonebreakers (because of the vulgarity of the 
theme), and Picasso’s Les Demoiselles 
d'Avignon also provoked shock (due both to 
the vulgarity of the theme and the unusual 
presentation) at the beginning of the 20th 
century. But even as their value was debated, 
at least it was clear that they were paintings. 
Later, however, already with Picasso, “neither 
painting nor sculpture” art objects begin to 
appear, transcending the usual boundaries 
between these categories of artworks. Artists 
started to create pieces about which it was 
unclear at first sight whether they were 
artworks at all. Duchamp’s snow shovel 
(Prelude to a Broken Arm) is perceptually 
identical to an ordinary snow shovel. Thus, 
the “christening” of the art world is needed 
for it to become an artwork (Danto, 1974). 
Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box is also perceptually 
almost identical to the Brillo boxes lying on 
supermarket shelves. This specific work will 
be the one to inspire Arthur C. Danto’s art 
philosophical reflection on what it is that 
differentiates art objects from ordinary ones. 
It is a question that can only be asked because 
artists who create based on the requirement 
of originality can sometimes produce 
artworks which are not evidently artworks at 
all. 
Finally, I would also like to mention here 
those artworks which consciously seek to 
destroy the aura of art. For instance, 
Duchamp’s LHOOQ targets the most famous 
work in art history, the Mona Lisa of Leonardo 
da Vinci. With noble simplicity, Duchamp has 
drawn a discrete moustache and a goatee to 
Mona Lisa and renamed the image with an 
anagram with a vulgar meaning in French. 
This is not only an early example of 
appropriation art but also a malicious and 
cynical appropriation. Duchamp ridicules 
here the so-called “retinal art”, which 
proclaims the sanctity of the artwork, seeks to 
delight the eye, and is thoroughly 
humourless. The masterpiece of the greatest 
Renaissance master is unseated from the 
throne and thrown into the context of 
disrespectful and rude jokes.  
Piero Manzoni’s strategy is diametrically 
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opposed to Duchamp’s. He lifts the vulgar to 
the level of the sanctified artwork, thus 
damaging its aura. In 1961, he created 90 
small tin cans, sealed with the text “Merda 
d’artista” (”Artist's Shit”), which supposedly 
each contain 30 grams of the substance 
mentioned in the title. Manzoni priced his tin 
cans at 37 dollars, equalising each gram of 
their content with 1 gram of gold. The work of 
this artist, who died at a young age, was soon 
bought by collectors, at a much steeper price 
than gold. 182,500 pounds were paid for a 
can at Christie’s in 2015, and another one 
went for 275,000 Euros in Milan in 2016. 
Manzoni’s tin cans are interpreted as a 
parody of the market, or as a critique of 
consumerism and the waste generated by it. 
However, the artist’s correspondence reveals 
that the critique of the fetishisation of art also 
played a role here: if the collectors value the 
artist’s touch so much, then let the artist give 
them a truly personal and direct product. Of 
course, we still do not know what the tin cans 
contain. If someone would open a can, this 
irreplaceable artwork, now worth several 
hundred thousand dollars, would be 
destroyed. Here the artist’s gesture is a 
radical one, and at once cynical and witty, 
since the secret sealed in the box increases its 
attraction. 
Manzoni literally asks us the question: are we 
really willing to accept any shit as art? And the 
answer based on the modern paradigm of art 
is a resounding yes – if the artistic genius 
produces and presents it to us as art. 
3.3. The genius against himself 
Art is, in its modern paradigm, the art of the 
genius. In other words, we have art if the 
work is produced through the natural and 
non-transferable talent of the creative 
genius. At the same time, due to the non-
conceptual character of beauty, the genius 
has no choice but to be original and thus 
should not recognise any external constraints. 
He can paint cubist or abstract canvases, 
create installations, or build a bridge from the 
mainland to an island (Christo: The Floating 
Piers, 2016, on Lake Iseo) – in fact, the genius 
can do anything, since he is the one who 
imposes the rules in art, but with a caveat. 
Namely, „that since there can also be original 
nonsense, its products must at the same time 
be models, i.e., exemplary” (Kant, 2000, 186). 
Now, whether a specific creation is nonsense 
or exemplary is decided by the attitude of the 
art world. 
But can the artist even renounce creation 
itself, based on the requirement of 
originality? And can he call into question the 
basic requirement, i.e., originality? In this 
paradigm, the answer is yes, if he does it 
originally. 
During the past century, artists have worked 
out several resourceful strategies to 
undermine the concept of the original and 
exceptionally talented creator itself. Here, I 
would like to highlight among them the case 
of the ready-made, followed by ephemeral 
and interactive works, appropriation 
strategies, and relational art.  
The ready-made is almost the diametrical 
opposite of the chef d’oeuvre created by the 
artistic genius. It is not made by the hand of 
the artist and does not carry his touch. 
Moreover, it is not even an original product, 
but a mass-produced object.  Nevertheless, 
the concept itself of the ready-made is 
radically original, with the questioning of 
“retinal painting”, the highlighting of an 
everyday object in order to demonstrate the 
possibility of an art that is independent of 
aesthetics, and the witty titles – i.e., all the 
elements elevated by Duchamp as “cerebral 
dexterity” in place of “manual dexterity”. 
In the case of ephemeral works of art, the 
artist gives up on the complete and finished 
work, and builds on her work the corrosive 
effect of time. Thus, it is impossible to 
establish which one the final form of the 
artwork is. Generally, we expect from the 
artistic genius to create fully enclosed, 
complete, and durable works of art. Relying 
themselves on the requirement of originality, 
artists renounce this possibility for creating 
states that can only be imagined, but not 
determined in advance by them. This is the 
case, for instance, of Urs Fischer’s Untitled, 
whose greatness stems precisely from its 
continuous decay. For the 2011 Venice 
Biennale, he brought an installation 
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occupying an entire room, with the life-sized 
and lifelike replica of the 16th-century 
sculptor Giambologna’s Rape of the Sabine 
Women at its centre. The statue functioned as 
a giant candle whose wick was lit at the 
opening ceremony, to slowly but surely melt 
the beautifully carved statue of Giambologna. 
This ephemeral work brings the devastating 
effect of time closer to us through the 
example of the artwork supposedly created 
for eternity. 
In the case of interactive works, the artist 
shares the joy and the responsibility of 
creation with the public by producing 
situations or objects which are only 
completed through the activity of the 
recipient. This was the case with #Jan25 
(#Sidibouzid, #Feb12, #Feb14, #Feb17…), 
presented by the artist collective Norma 
Jeane, also at the 2011 Venice Biennale. This 
block of coloured tri-tone plasticine, 
reminiscent of the Egyptian flag (black, white 
and red), was titled after the most popular 
Twitter hashtags used to inform and involve 
people across the world during the Arab 
revolutions. The members of the collective 
invited the visitors to use the plasticine cube 
as they wish in the spirit of the freedom of 
expression. Soon, the entire room was filled 
with forms and texts in these three colours, 
demonstrating the playfulness and creativity 
of the recipients. Certainly, the freedom of 
expression is not without its dangers. The 
artists could not foresee how the visitors will 
use their plasticine, and the wall could also 
have been filled with hate speech or obscene 
messages. Nevertheless, the freedom of 
expression represents a value, which is worth 
the risk. After all, the public enthusiastically 
collaborated on completing the artwork. 
As for the procedures of artistic 
appropriation, their first forms consisted of 
using objects outside of the aesthetic realm. 
In this sense, the collages of Picasso and 
Braque, or Duchamp’s ready-mades were also 
based on appropriation. Later, pop art 
appropriated the objects of mass culture, 
from Warhol’s Brillo boxes to the popular 
genre of the comics (Roy Lichtenstein). In the 
80s, artists began to appropriate entire 
artworks (Sherry Levine, Elaine Sturtevant), 
genres (Cindy Sherman), and styles of 
individual creations (Yasumasa Morimura). It 
is also an appropriation strategy for artists to 
exhibit collections along with, or instead of, 
their own work. At the 2009 Venice Biennale, 
the Nordic and Danish Pavilions presented 
Michael Elmgreen’s and Ingar Dragset’s The 
Collectors, offering two narratives, one of the 
murdered gay writer and the other one of the 
wealthy family forced to sell their home. 
Elmgreen and Dragset were both creators and 
curators of this work since they invited 24 
further individual artists and artist collectives 
to contribute to their project. It was especially 
interesting to encounter here Elaine 
Sturtevant’s work, which copied the black 
canvas of Frank Stella, as an appropriation’s 
appropriation. 
Nicolas Bourriaud subsumes the various 
appropriation procedures under the concept 
of “postproduction”: 
Notions of originality (being at the origin of) 
and even of creation (making something from 
nothing) are slowly blurred in this new cultural 
landscape marked by the twin figures of the DJ 
and the programmer, both of whom have the 
task of selecting cultural objects and inserting 
them into new contexts. (Bourriaud, 2005: 13).  
He also offered the first discussion of 
relational art in his Relational Aesthetics 
(2002), providing an interpretive frame for 
artworks, which are not, objects, but “a state 
of encounter” (Bourriaud, 2002: 18). It is the 
requirement of originality alone that makes it 
possible, e.g., for Rirkrit Tiravanija to prepare 
curry for the gallery visitors, not as a culinary 
but a fine artist. In most cases of relational 
art, the artist only provides a framework for 
the members of the public to act and 
establish relationships between themselves. 
However, there are also relational works of 
art, which do not create new relationships but 
question our existing human relations. 
Santiago Sierra’s works fall into this latter 
category. He usually invites people to perform 
demeaning tasks for a minimum amount of 
pay. In one of his works, he paid participants 
to let a line be tattooed on their backs. In 
2001, for his work entitled 133 persons paid 
to have their hair dyed blonde, he asked 
emigrants struggling in Venice and African 
people involved in an illegal trade to change 
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their hair colour. Suddenly, black skinned 
people with shining blonde hair began to 
stand out on Venice’s narrow streets and 
bridges, and their presence involving 
uncomfortable questions could not be 
ignored anymore. Sierra himself does not 
tattoo or dye people’s hair. He only invents 
the framework which will highlight how 
human relationships function under 
capitalism. 
4. Where are the frontiers? 
As we have seen, the modern paradigm of art 
can be derived from Kant’s ideas on non-
conceptual beauty. If beauty lacks concepts, 
i.e., cannot be defined by objective 
characteristics, then the fine arts must also 
lack rules of production and objective 
evaluation criteria. The artistic genius is the 
one who has to impose the rules on art, and 
his most important quality is originality. There 
is a necessary logical implication between the 
idea of non-conceptual beauty and the 
requirement of originality. 
This is the starting point for the way in which 
we have been seeing art for over two 
centuries: based on their exceptional inborn 
talent, artistic geniuses create artworks which 
we admire in museums. At the same time, this 
is also the condition for the possibility for free 
creation that is enjoyed by artists, who can 
even experiment with the deconstruction of 
this paradigm, while being firmly established 
on its very basis. However, as also seen above, 
these experiments remain within the modern 
paradigm of art. The pillars of the modern 
paradigm do not crumble but are redefined, 
as the meaning of originality, creation, 
artwork, and museum is continuously 
rewritten. 
Can the modern paradigm of art be 
overcome? I guess that it cannot, as long as 
art is fine art, and originality remains the 
categorical imperative of art. If the artist has 
to be original, then originality can even entail 
its own questioning – as long as it is done 
originally. 
The overcoming of the paradigm could be 
conceived as the reestablishment of an 
already transcended state. In this case, art 
would not be considered valuable in itself, but 
serve an outside purpose. Furthermore, the 
artist would not need to be original, but to 
know his (or her) craft. This would mean that 
we have come to the end of the age in which 
art considered itself to be autonomous. But I 
do not see how we could leave the modern 
paradigm of art behind us and also preserve 
the autonomy of art. 
Nevertheless, one should not forget that art is 
the most creative of human pursuits. As such, 
it can still surprise us with unforeseeable 
practical solutions and theoretical 
assumptions. It would be indeed beautiful.  
 
Bibliographical references  
 
Benjamin, Walter. (2008) The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility: Second Version. 
Cambridge London: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press  
Bourriaud, Nicolas. (2005) Postproduction. Culture as 
Screenplay: How Art Reprograms The WORLD. New 
York: Lukas & Sternberg. 
Bourriaud, Nicolas. (2002) Relational Aesthetics. Dijon: Les 
presses du réel. 
Danto, Arthur C. (1974) The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 33(2), 139-148. 
Gaie, Ștefan. (2017) Arta. O introducere. Cluj: Presa 
Universitară Clujeană. 
Kant, Immanuel. (2000) Critique of the power of judgment. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. (1951) The Modern System of the 
Arts. A Study in the History of Aesthetics. Part I *. 
Journal of the History of Ideas 12(4), 496-527. 
-----. (1952) The Modern System of the Arts. A Study in the 
History of Aesthetics. Part II. Journal of the History 
of Ideas 13(1), 17-46. 
Schopenhauer, Arthur. (2010) The world as will and 
representation. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
 
